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Abstract: Regulatory measures constitute a significant barrier to cross-border services trade in 
sectors including transport, communications, business services, insurance, and recreation. However, 
regulation has weaker effects on trade in financial services, distribution, and construction. Entry 
barriers and conduct regulations have heterogeneous effects across sectors, as do particular 
measures such as licensing requirements, economic needs tests, restrictions on business form, and 
limitations on advertising. In addition, regional trade agreements (RTAs) are trade creating in 
communications, finance, and distribution, but have only weak effects in other sectors. Contrary to 
findings for goods markets, trade diversion is relatively limited for services RTAs. 
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1.  Introduction 
World trade in services has increased substantially during the last two decades. Especially since 
2001-2002, world services trade has expanded with an annual average growth rate of 10.7% against 
a similar growth rate of 6.6% for the period 1990 to 1999. There is little doubt that declining entry 
barriers and regulation-related costs, as well as the increased use of information and communication 
technology, have helped to expand the scope of this trade. At the same time, starting from around 
2001 the number of regional trade agreements (RTAs) with a services component has started to 
increase (Figure 1). 
Two types of regulations need to be addressed when liberalizing services trade or negotiating 
services agreements. First are economy-wide regulations that are important for the whole domestic 
economy, which also affect the total amount of services trade. However, services are heterogeneous 
in nature, and as a result sector-specific regulations are at least as important from a trade 
perspective. Both types of regulations are comprised of many sub-levels of regulation with each of 
them having different effects on services trade. In principle, all these types of regulation are being 
negotiated in RTAs to facilitate special access to services imports and exports. Yet, RTA negotiations 
need to be “deep” as well as sectorally broad in order to make meaningful trade contributions.  
Against this background, this paper addresses the question of the extent to which regulation and 
regional integration in services constitute drivers of bilateral services trade. We assess this question 
by focusing on detailed regulations at the sector level that affect sector-specific services trade. We 
also include measures of trade creation and trade diversion of services RTAs, including the EU. This 
allows us to evaluate what types of regulation for which services sectors drive trade expansion, and 
whether or not negotiated RTAs play a contributing role in that process.  
Our paper makes three specific contributions relative to the existing literature. First, we map all 
available policy data to sector-specific services trade flows using nine different services sectors. 
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Most work on services trade flows using gravity as an empirical framework does not use any sectoral 
disaggregation, or work with policy variables that are developed at the sectoral level. Second, this 
paper uses new data on services trade developed by Francois et al. (2009), and which have been 
collected from many different data sources. Availability of services trade data remains a significant 
constraint for researchers, but this new database—which is relatively unexploited in the literature—
significantly improves country and sector coverage. Last, the data allow us to use panel data 
techniques to control for unobserved heterogeneity across countries and through time, while still 
retaining data on policy measures.   
The paper by Kox and Nordas (2007) is closest to our line of research, but those authors only analyze 
how domestic regulation affecting total costs has an impact on trade in business services and 
financial services. It is not clear to what extent more detailed regulatory factors affect trade flows by 
way of separating fixed entry and variable costs for more sectors, such as transport, insurance, or 
telecommunication services. The empirical services trade literature on RTAs using gravity is even 
scarcer, although Marchetti (2009) finds in a cross-section of countries that for total services, the 
trade effect of RTAs is not any different from deep integration initiatives such as the EU. However, 
that study does not take stock of any third country effects, such as trade diversion.  
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the existing gravity literature on services 
trade, focusing on policy variables, sectoral disaggregation, and regional integration. Section 3 
presents our empirical strategy and data, and provides some preliminary non-parametric evidence 
on the importance of cross-sectoral heterogeneity. Section 4 discusses the results of our analysis 
and, finally, the last section concludes, discusses policy implications, and presents directions for 
future research.  
2.  Literature Review 
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There remains a split in the services literature between contributions dealing with regulatory policy 
indicators on the one hand, and those dealing with regional integration on the other. To date no 
work has tried to connect these two strands of the literature. Moreover, work that has estimated 
the impact of regulatory variables on services trade focuses only on aggregate flows, thus obscuring 
the possibility of significant cross-sectoral heterogeneity in the responsiveness of trade flows to 
policy.  
Earlier work that has analyzed services trade flows using a gravity framework has shown that 
standard variables from the goods literature also generally apply to aggregate services trade, albeit 
with some differences in coefficients and variable significance.4 However, empirical techniques vary 
considerably across papers; the earlier work, in particular, does not tend to incorporate theory-
based gravity model specifications, such as the one developed by Anderson and Van Wincoop 
(2003). 
Sector specific analyses using gravity are uncommon in the literature, and tend only to cover a small 
number of sectors. Kox and Nordas (2009), for instance, look at transport and business services, and 
their interaction with an overall regulatory indicator. Other contributions, such as Kox and Nordas 
(2007), include financial services and other business services. A study by Francois et al. (2007) also 
only covers some sectors such as transport services, producer services, other business services, and 
other non-trade services. Fink (2009) has by far the most sectoral detail, but the model only includes 
data for European countries combined with basic gravity variables. Some studies (e.g. Kox et al., 
2005; Schwellnus, 2007; Lennon, 2009; and Head et al., 2009) only choose as an alternative to total 
services trade the category of other commercial services: this classification excludes specific 
                                                          
4
 Examples include: Francois (1993); Freund and Weinhold (2002); Grünfeld and Moxnes (2003); Kimura and 
Lee (2004); Lennon (2008); Kox and Nordas (2007); Schwellnus (2007); and Walsh (2004). Differences between 
services and goods are notably found in distance, language and contiguity.  
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producer services such as transport, but is so broad that it still masks possible heterogeneity among, 
for example, telecommunications, finance, and construction services.  
Aggregation is also a notable feature of previous work when it comes to the use of policy variables. 
Even Kox et al. (2009) and Schwellnus (2007), which use some level of sectoral disaggregation, only 
use the OECD’s Product Market Regulation (PMR) indicator as an economy-wide indicator of policy 
barriers. In fact, the PMR database encompasses many different sub-level indicators such as state 
control, barriers to enterprise, and barriers to trade and investment—a feature that we exploit in 
this paper. Kox and Lejour (2006) use the more disaggregate sub-levels of this indicator in a cross-
sectional setting for other commercial services, but with mixed results. Francois et al. (2007) use 
three higher level indicators for their different categories of services sectors, and find that barriers 
to entrepreneurship form the most important barrier to services imports, especially for producer 
and other business services. However, more sector-specific analysis remains unexplored in their 
study and the authors call for more in-depth analysis using the regulatory policy indicators.  
In a similar manner, Kox and Nordas (2007) estimate total costs of entering and servicing a market 
within the OECD area by collecting various economy-wide regulatory policy variables. Their analysis 
includes a detailed list of general policies. At the extensive margin, they find that for both total and 
other business services, trade regulation matters for both the importer and exporter sides. At the 
intensive margin, business services trade is more sensitive to economy-wide regulatory restrictions 
than total services trade.  
Our work builds on and extends this area of research in several ways. First, we include detailed 
sector-level services trade data along with a rich set of sector-level regulatory policy variables. 
Second, by doing so we are also able to not only measure regulation proxies for fixed entry costs but 
also explore how these detailed levels of regulation affect the variable cost structure, and hence act 
as a barrier for services trade at the intensive margin.  
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The second strand of research that we develop in the paper deals with the impact of regional 
integration on services trade flows. We include a set of variables that measure the extent of regional 
services integration in our country sample. Our motivation for doing so comes from Miroudot et al. 
(2010), who find that trade costs are usually higher in services than in goods, but that RTAs with a 
services component tend to result in lower trade costs for members and third parties alike. The 
reason may lie in the nature of regulatory barriers to services trade, which are often applied 
universally. Thus, even regional reforms tend to be applied in a way that is relatively non-
discriminatory compared with the situation in goods markets.  
Recent studies on services trade in the regional context (e.g. Marchetti, 2009; Shingal, 2010; and 
Guillin, 2010) tend to include an RTA dummy for total services trade flows, and find that it has a 
positive and statistically significant coefficient. However, they do not deal with the possibility of 
trade diversion, which is a point we take up explicitly here. Francois and Hoekman (2009) is the only 
exception: the authors take account of possible trade diversion, and conclude that at the sector level 
trade diversion takes place for business and ICT services within the EU bloc. 
Studies that include an EU dummy as one example of an RTA are more common. Examples include 
Park (2002), Walsh (2006), Kox and Nordas (2007; 2009), Francois and Hoekman (2009), and van der 
Marel (2011). Results have been mixed, however. Fink (2009) goes furthest in detail, and finds that 
most services sectors exhibit a significant EU15 effect, except travel, transport, and financial and 
insurance services.5  However, the results of most regional integration dummies in services are 
largely dependent on what type of fixed effects, data, and estimation techniques are used. 
3.  Methodology and Data  
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 There are also several in-depth studies that analyze the general effect of European market integration for 
specific services, such as Cummings and Rubio-Misas (2006) for the insurance sector, or Maijoor et al. (1998) 
for auditing. Lejour and de Paiva Verheyden (2004), as well as Kox and Lejour (2006), search for a general trade 
effect within the EU.  
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3.1  Gravity Model Specification 
As in much of the empirical trade literature for both goods and services, our starting point for the 
analysis is the standard theory-based gravity model of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003; 2004). It 
takes the following form:  
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  is exports from economy i to economy j in sector k at time period t;    
  is sectoral 
expenditure;    
  is sectoral production;     
  is bilateral trade costs; s is the intra-sectoral elasticity of 
substitution (between varieties within a sector); and     
  is a random error term satisfying standard 
assumptions. The    
  and   
  terms represent multilateral resistance, which means that trade 
patterns are determined by the level of bilateral trade costs relative to trade costs elsewhere in the 
world. Inward multilateral resistance     
              
  
     
        
  
      
    captures the 
dependence of economy j’s imports on trade costs across all suppliers. Outward multilateral 
resistance     
              
  
     
        
  
      
    captures the dependence of economy i’s 
exports on trade costs across all destination markets. The w terms in both these equations are 
weights equivalent to each economy’s share in global output or expenditure.  
Empirical work based on equation (1) should ideally account for multilateral resistance by, for 
example, using fixed effects. However, this is not fully possible in the present case since the analysis 
focuses on regulatory data that vary by exporting country, but not across importing country for a 
given exporter. In other words, these variables are monadic rather than dyadic, and would thus be 
perfectly collinear with the fixed effects.  
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A second-best estimation alternative in this context is to use fixed effects to account for inward 
multilateral resistance, and random effects for outward multilateral resistance as presented in the 
following equation:6 
             
      
         
      
        
                
       
  
with    
        . In equation (2) the random effects specification puts more structure on the data 
than fixed effects, because it assumes that outward multilateral resistance can be adequately 
summarized by a random variable that follows a normal distribution. A fixed effects specification for 
inward multilateral resistance, however, allows for unconstrained variation. This mixed effects 
model with fixed effects by exporter and random effects by importer represents an acceptable 
compromise in this instance between research objectives and empirical rigor. Of note, since we are 
dealing with panel data, is that for both the fixed and random effects, we follow Baldwin and 
Taglioni (2006) in recognizing that since trade costs vary over time, so too must the terms that 
capture multilateral resistance.  
The final part of the gravity model is the trade costs function t. Our specification of this cost function 
is presented in equation (3) and includes a measure of services sector regulatory policies taken from 
several data sources of the OECD (see further below).  
            
                 
                                               
                                                  
 
                                                          
6
 We also performed estimations which show that fixed effects formulations produce generally similar results 
to those provided here. These additional results are available upon request. However, it is necessary to 
average policy variable across the exporting and importing economies to obtain some form of dyadic 
expression for the regulatory policy variables. This actually makes results much more difficult to interpret in a 
policy sense.  
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where the variable called regulation in equation (3) is equal to each of the detailed regulatory 
variables sequentially. We include regulation for the importing country only since it is on this side of 
the bilateral trade relationship that the regulatory measures are most likely to act as barriers to 
trade.  
To account for regional trade integration forces in services we apply two types of  measures. The 
first is a dummy variable equal to unity when both members of a country pair belong to the same 
RTA (       ). This is to capture the average effect of being in an RTA. Additionally, an EU dummy is 
included to verify whether the EU has any effect beyond the world average (      ). To have a 
consistent approach with the theoretical literature, we also account for the possibility of trade 
diversion associated with regional integration. Following Frankel (1997), we therefore include a 
dummy that takes the value of one whenever one member of a country pair is part of an RTA or the 
EU but the other is not (           and          ). These variables measure the extent of trade 
between members and non-members of these agreements.  
Finally, we include standard trade costs proxies from the gravity model literature, to take account of 
“natural” trade costs. We include international distance, as well as dummy variables for countries 
that share a common border, common colonial heritage, or common language. 
To estimate the model we substitute equation (3) into equation (2) and enter the fixed effects as 
dummy variables. We then estimate the model by GLS.7  
3.2  Data Sources and Description  
The dependant variable (exports) comes from the Trade in Services Database (Francois et al., 2009). 
This dataset combines primary data from various sources such as the OECD, Eurostat, and IMF 
                                                          
7
 In the spirit of Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), we tried estimating a Poisson mixed effects model as well. 
However, estimates failed to converge in a number of cases, probably due to the large number of fixed and 
random effects present. GLS estimates are therefore the best available, given numerical constraints. 
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Balance of Payments statistics, and uses mirroring techniques to produce the most complete dataset 
currently available on bilateral services trade. It uses a sectoral disaggregation that follows the GTAP 
scheme commonly used in general equilibrium modeling. As such, there are nine different sectors, 
namely business services, construction, communication, finance, insurance, public services, 
recreation comprised of travel services and recreation services, trade services, and finally transport 
services. Table 1 provides summary statistics for all sector specifications. For our analysis, we take 
annual data from 1992 to 2006.  
The model includes regulatory policy variables taken mainly from the OECD Indicators of Product 
Market Regulation database. This database consists of several sub-databases such as the Indicators 
of Economy-wide Regulation (PMR) which contain indicators of policy regimes, Indicators of Sectoral 
Regulation (NMR) which measure regulatory conditions in professional services and retail trade, and 
finally we also take regulatory measures in energy, transport, and communications as part of the 
ECTR database. All economy-wide policy variables and sector-level indicators are measured for the 
years 1998, 2003, and 2008 for mainly OECD countries and some emerging countries such as China 
and India. The ECTR database holds data from 1975 to 2005 and all variables we select from this 
database range from 1992 to 2005. All policy variables make a clear distinction between up-front 
fixed entry costs, measured by entry barriers, and regulations that only affect the operational 
proceedings of a business once established. Our ability to investigate these issues in a sector-specific 
context adds value to the previous literature, such as Fillet-Castejón et al. (2008), which focuses on 
total fixed and variable cost effects. Table 2 provides summary statistics for all general and sector-
specific regulatory indicators. 
Data on regional trade integration in the form of a services RTA or membership of the EU are taken, 
respectively, from Miroudot et al. (2010) and from publicly available data on accession to the 
European Union. Standard gravity model controls measuring natural geographic trade barriers are 
taken from CEPII. Full details of our data and sources are provided in Table 3. 
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3.3 Preliminary Evidence 
Before moving to a fully specified regression model with sectoral data in the next section, we first 
present some initial evidence on the links between services policies and trade using non-parametric 
methods. Figure 2 shows non-parametric regressions of total services imports in two sectors—
business services and construction services—and an overall measure of policy restrictiveness from 
the OECD’s PMR database. Both regressions use a pure cross-section for the year 2005. The left hand 
panel discloses a noticeable negative relationship between policy restrictiveness and trade in 
business services. The right hand panel, by contrast, shows an essentially flat regression line, which 
tends to indicate that there is little impact of regulation on trade in construction services. Of course, 
part of the difference in these two results is due to the different modes of supply that are commonly 
used for each sector: business services rely heavily on GATS Mode 1, in addition to Mode 3, whereas 
construction relies more heavily on Mode 4. Since our trade data only capture Mode 1 trade, the 
weaker connection between regulation and trade in construction services is not unexpected. 
However, it highlights the potentially important role that cross-sectoral heterogeneity can play when 
analyzing the impacts of services sector reforms. 
4.  Estimation Results  
Table 4 presents baseline gravity model results for sector-specific services trade using overall indices 
of regulatory restrictiveness in each sector, which cover entry barriers and conduct regulations 
together. Standard gravity model variables such as distance generally have the expected signs and 
magnitudes, and are statistically significant. R2s indicate that the gravity model has considerable 
explanatory power for services trade, accounting for between 55% and 79% of the observed 
variation in bilateral trade flows. 
In terms of the variables of main interest—the policy indicators—we find that services trade is 
clearly sensitive to the level of policy restrictiveness in an overall sense in the transport, 
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communications, business, insurance, and recreation sectors (columns 1-6 and 12). In transport, we 
find that regulations affecting road transport and air transport both impact aggregate trade flows in 
this sector, but that air transport regulations have the strongest impact. Similarly, in 
communications, it is both telecom and postal regulations that matter for trade, although the latter 
have a stronger impact. There are no policy data available on business services as such, so we use an 
indicator of restrictiveness in professional services as a proxy. It is a simple average of restrictions in 
accounting, architecture, engineering, and legal services. Results clearly indicate that policy 
measures can have a significant impact on trade in business services, which is an important finding in 
light of the increasing role played by business process outsourcing in the global services economy. 
The same is true of insurance services. Again, no policy data are available for recreation services, so 
we use restrictions on air transport services as a proxy, and find that there is a significant 
relationship with trade flows. In terms of quantitative magnitude, the strongest relationship 
between policy and trade flows is in insurance services, followed by business services. Then 
communication, transport, and recreation are respectively important in size.   
In the other sectors, the regulatory index always has the expected negative coefficient, but it is not 
statistically significant. One possible reason for this result is that there is not a perfect 
correspondence between the sectoral definitions adopted by the trade data and those used to 
calculate the restrictiveness indices. This effect weakens the link between the regulatory data and 
the corresponding trade data. 
The other coefficients of interest are the regional integration and EU dummies. In both cases, we 
find mixed evidence: the impact of preferential liberalization on trade obviously depends greatly on 
the nature of sectoral commitments by liberalizing countries, as well as on the characteristics of 
different services sectors. For instance, RTAs tend to be strongly trade creating among members in 
the communications, finance, and trade services sectors, but not in other sectors. In some cases, 
there is even evidence of RTAs reducing intra-bloc trade—transport and construction are 
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examples—but such results should be interpreted with caution due to the fact that cross-modal 
issues are important in both cases, and our data only capture primarily GATS Mode 1 trade. One 
possibility is that RTAs induce trade in other forms, such as under Mode 3, and that inter-modal 
substitution dominates any concomitant complementarities; however, our data do not allow us to 
take this hypothesis any further. Interestingly, there is evidence from a number of sectors—
transport, communications, business services, finance, and trade services—that RTAs are also trade 
creating with respect to non-members. This result contrasts with the goods literature, in which RTAs 
are frequently found to be trade diverting with respect to non-members. As hypothesized by 
Miroudot et al. (2010), the difference is likely explained by the fact that RTA commitments in 
services tend to be relatively non-discriminatory because they are based on broad regulatory 
reforms rather than specific preferences in favor of particular economies. Only in construction 
services is there significant evidence of a trade diversion effect vis-à-vis non-members of an RTA. 
Although the EU represents probably the deepest services RTA in our sample, results for the EU 
dummies are highly mixed. The general conclusion from Table 4 is that the EU does not appear to 
create more trade among members than do services RTAs on average, and indeed it may even be 
less effective in some sectors, such as transport, communications, and recreation. On the other 
hand, there is more evidence of trade diversion with respect to non-members for the EU than for 
RTAs on average: the diversion dummy variable has a negative and significant coefficient for 
transport, communications, and recreation, but a positive and significant coefficient for business 
services, insurance, finance, and trade services. This result again highlights the strong potential for 
cross-sectoral heterogeneity in the trade impacts of RTAs such as the EU. 
4.1 Results using Detailed Policy Indicators  
In the remainder of this section, we pursue the same general approach as for the models in Table 4, 
but use more detailed policy data than the general indices used previously. The advantage of this 
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approach is that it allows us to identify with more precision the types of regulations that matter 
most for particular types of services trade, and at the same time to highlight once again the 
importance of cross-sectoral heterogeneity in accounting for the effects of policy on services trade. 
Since results for the RTA and EU dummies are generally in accordance with those from the Table 4 
regressions, the discussion here focuses only on the additional policy data. 
Results for transport services appear in columns 1-3 of Table 5, using data for air transport policies 
only. The OECD policy data allow us to distinguish two types of measures: entry barriers, and public 
ownership. Columns 1-2 enter each variable separately, and column 3 enters them jointly. Model 
results suggest that both types of policy have a negative and significant effect on trade, but that the 
impact of entry barriers is slightly stronger. 
The remaining columns of Table 5 present results for the communications sector. In this case, the 
OECD data identify three types of policies: entry barriers, public ownership, and market structure. 
Although each policy indicator has the expected negative sign and is statistically significant when 
entered separately into the regression, entering all three together (column 7) results in only entry 
barriers having a statistically significant marginal impact. The reason is that all three types of 
measures tend to occur together, and the resulting correlation inflates the estimated standard 
errors in column 7. Nonetheless, we conclude that entry barriers are the primary policy of concern in 
relation to communication services. 
Table 6 presents results for business services, using data on entry barriers (columns 1-4) and conduct 
regulations (columns 5-8) separately. The strongest result in terms of entry barriers is for licensing 
requirements: they are negatively and significantly associated with trade in business services when 
entered separately into the regression (column 1), and when included with other entry barrier 
variables (column 4). Education requirements only have a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient when entered separately (column 2); in the joint regression, they have a negative but 
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statistically insignificant coefficient, presumably because of correlation with other policy measures. 
Contrary to expectations, the presence of quotas and economic needs tests is positively associated 
with trade in business services, although the relationship is only statistically significant in the joint 
regression (column 4). We do not place too much weight on this result, however, as it might be 
explained by the fact that such policies apply mostly to trade via GATS Mode 3 (commercial 
presence), which means that suppliers may indeed have an incentive to undertake greater Mode 1 
trade—which is what our data capture—when Mode 3 is relatively restricted. This is only 
speculation, however, as data on both modes of supply would be required to test such a hypothesis. 
Interestingly, results for conduct regulations as opposed to entry barriers are somewhat weaker in 
the case of business services (Table 6 columns 5-8). Although advertising regulations and regulations 
affecting prices and fees both have negative and significant coefficients when entered separately, it 
is only the latter that have a statistically significant effect when all three policy variables are entered 
together. Regulations affecting the type of business form that can be used by foreign entrants do not 
appear to have any significant effect on trade; however, we again note that such measures tend to 
affect Mode 3 trade more than Mode 1 trade, and so this finding is not necessarily surprising. Finally, 
the magnitude of the coefficient on price and fee regulations is noticeably smaller in absolute value 
than the coefficient on licensing requirements (column 4), which suggests that trade flows in 
business services may in general be more sensitive to entry barriers than to conduct regulations. 
Tables 7 and 8 show results for insurance and financial services respectively. Both licensing and 
educational requirements play a significant negative role for insurance services when included in the 
regression separately (columns 1-3) and together (column 4). This finding is in contrast with business 
services where only licensing requirements as part of entry barriers are significantly important. As 
for quotas and economic needs test, they are positively associated with insurance trade in the joint 
regression (column 4). This result is contrary to expectations, but could again be the result of cross-
modal substitution. The results for the variables on conduct regulation become significant only when 
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the variables are taken separately for regulation on advertising (column 6) and prices and fees 
(column 7). However, no meaningful outcomes appear when taking all the variables on conduct 
regulation together in column 8. 
The results for the financial sector in Table 8 are somewhat different from those for insurance 
services. Contrary to insurance, regulation on educational requirements appears to have a stronger 
effect compared to licensing requirements (columns 1-2). This finding is reinforced when taking 
these variables together (column 4):  only educational requirements play a significant role. 
Regulation on quotas and economic needs tests again have a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient. As said, data on both modes 1 and 3 of services supply would be required to assess 
whether substitution effects are present within this sector, but our results strongly suggest that 
Mode 1 trade in finance is influenced by putting in place measures that are largely targeted for trade 
under Mode 3. However, results for conduct regulations in finance do not have any meaningful 
significance when these policy variables are entered separately (columns 5-8) or when considered 
together (column 8). These latter results are in line with insurance and business services.       
Results for construction services are in Table 9. We created a special policy indicator for this sector, 
consisting of an unweighted average of the sub-level indicators of entry and conduct regulation for 
architectural and engineering services together. As for the business services regressions, columns 1-
4 present results using data on entry barriers, and columns 5-8 use data on conduct regulations. 
Taking entry barriers first, columns 3-4 show that it is only education requirements that have a 
negative and statistically significant impact on trade in this sector. This finding contrasts again with 
business services, in which licensing requirements play a major role. Again, quotas and economic 
needs tests have an unexpected positive and statistically significant coefficient, but this finding is 
likely explained by the type of cross-modal substitution discussed in the context of business services. 
Indeed, such a mechanism is all the more likely to operate since only a small part of the construction 
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services sector—such as architectural or engineering consulting services—can be traded via GATS 
Mode 1. 
As was the case for business, insurance, and financial services, trade in construction services is also 
more affected by entry barriers than by conduct regulations. None of the conduct regulation 
indicators in columns 5-8 has a negative and statistically significant coefficient. The positive and 
statistically significant coefficient on business form regulations is likely explained by cross-modal 
substitution: stricter regulations on business form provide operators with an incentive to trade via 
Mode 1 rather than Mode 3, thereby boosting the level of exports observed in our data. 
Columns 1-3 of Table 10 present results for recreation services. We use regulation of the air 
transport sector as a proxy for sectoral regulations, due to the lack of data specifically covering this 
sector. We consider two types of regulatory measures that can potentially impede trade in this area: 
entry barriers, and public ownership. Although both measures have negative and statistically 
significant coefficients when entered separately in the model (columns 1-2), only public ownership 
has a statistically significant impact on trade when the two are considered jointly (column 3). This 
result highlights the important role that market structure can play as a determinant of trade 
patterns on a sectoral level, and is at least partly in line with our results for the transport sector in 
Table 4. 
The final sector we consider is trade services (Table 10 columns 4-8). For the policy variables, we use 
OECD data on restrictions in the retail services sector as a proxy for sectoral regulations. Our data 
cover entry barriers, operating restrictions, and price controls. For this sector, only price controls 
(column 7) have a negative and statistically significant impact on trade, but this effect disappears 
when all three policy variables are entered together. As is the case in other sectors, correlation 
among the various policy indicators makes it difficult to identify the marginal effects of individual 
measures. 
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5 Conclusion  
This paper has shown that services RTAs, and regulatory policies more broadly, can have very 
different effects on different sectors. In line with previous work, we find considerable evidence of a 
link between regulatory restrictiveness and lower trade, but it is only statistically significant in some 
sectors; in other sectors, there is no evidence of such an effect. Similarly, we find that some sectors 
respond strongly to regional integration efforts with a services component, but that others do not. 
Interestingly, the data disclose relatively little evidence of trade diversion effects associated with 
services RTAs irrespective of the sector being analyzed, which is quite different from the main 
findings of the literature on trade in goods. 
From a policy point of view, our findings are important for two reasons. First, they highlight the 
importance of addressing sector-specific regulatory issues in addition to the general regulatory 
stance of a country with respect to the services sector as a whole. The breadth of the services sector, 
and the important role played by cross-sectoral heterogeneity, make the job of services negotiators 
a very difficult one, be it in multilateral or regional forums. There is a need in both cases for sectoral 
regulatory bodies to be involved in any broad-based efforts at services liberalization, which poses 
significant capacity issues for many developing countries. 
The second policy issue of interest that arises from our results relates to the role of services RTAs. 
The data strongly suggest that regional integration efforts have been effective in some sectors, but 
not in others. Although outside the scope of the present paper, it will be important for future work 
to play closer attention to the different levels of commitments undertaken in different sectors in 
services RTAs. Casual empiricism suggests that countries often approach different sectors with 
different levels of ambition in terms of liberalization. It therefore remains to be seen whether our 
findings are driven by heterogeneity in the application of similar liberalization approaches across 
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economically different sectors, or whether they simply reflect the very partial nature of many 
services RTAs in terms of sectoral scope and depth. 
In addition to investigating that issue further, future work could expand on our results in one 
important respect. We have relied on the best data currently available to obtain sectoral measures 
of policy restrictiveness. However, the OECD and the World Bank both currently have projects 
underway that intend to provide much more comprehensive policy coverage than existing OECD 
data. It is to be hoped that the results of their efforts will be made public in a timely manner, and 
that future research can identify with greater precision the types of policy measures that matter 
most for particular types of services trade. 
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Tables and Figures 
Figure 1: Number of Services RTAs and Level of Entry Barriers 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. Entry barriers (sourced from the OECD’s ECTR database) cover all 
countries in our data sample and are rescaled from 0-1. The RTAs in services represent any type of 
RTA with a services component. Years are for the date of notification. Data are taken from the 
WTO’s RTA database.  
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Figure 2: Total Imports of Business and Construction Services, and Level of Regulatory 
Restrictiveness, 2003. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Total and Sectoral Services Trade 
Sector Obs Mean($m) Std. Dev. Min Max 
Business 19227 96.2749 554.3159 -1.12744 14456 
Construction 18488 10.12213 51.10917 0 1529 
Communication 18705 5.946343 32.30766 0 1099 
Finance 18583 17.87175 156.3826 0 6514.336 
Insurance 18622 16.43861 229.0777 0 12685.31 
Public  19046 10.509 129.1836 0 7004 
Recreation 18632 5.842693 52.96298 0 2387 
Trade 4770 30.8305 150.6006 0 3379.606 
Transport 19826 143.1378 507.1419 0 9136 
Total 35110 184.1891 1067.294 -791.087 32824.34 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for Regulatory Indicators 
Regulation  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
PMR HL partner 19673 1.688564 0.4963851 0.82434 3.969725 
Admin. regulation HL  19673 1.712375 0.6075586 0.8134595 3.911994 
Domestic regulation HL  19673 2.333285 0.6004705 1.230521 4.510083 
State control ML 19673 2.527102 0.7719463 1.192639 4.862542 
Barriers to entrepr. ML 19673 1.790134 0.4859598 0.9537903 3.720589 
Barriers to invest. ML  19673 0.7484577 0.4950023 0.1984321 4.2033 
Airlines regulation  116271 2.182192 1.654495 0 6 
Telecom regulation  114759 2.077928 1.306062 0.1555921 6 
Post regulation  112680 3.319764 0.8219214 1.5 6 
Rail regulation  109711 4.184592 1.323794 0.375 6 
Road regulation  111123 1.631237 1.458576 0 6 
Accounting regulation  19529 2.454276 0.8514644 0 5.056624 
Architectural regulation  19529 1.699389 1.211898 0 4.412179 
Engineering regulation  19529 1.65898 1.336414 0 4.445513 
Legal regulation  19529 2.848653 1.070884 0 4.866667 
Retail regulation  18697 2.501305 1.10134 0.5043904 5.194862 
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Table 3: Data Sources 
Variable Variable description Source Period 
X Export value in US$ Trade in Services Database (Francois et al., 2009) 1992-2006 
Regulation  Overall regulation OECD Indicators of Product Market Regulation (PMR) 1998, 2003, 2008 
Regulation  Accounting, architectural, engineering, legal and retail 
regulation 
OECD Indicators of Sectoral Regulation (NMR) 1998, 2003, 2009 
Regulation  Airline, road, rail, telecom and post regulation OECD ECTR database (Electricity, Communications, Transport and Retail) 1992-2005 
Dist, Contig, Colony, Language Distance, sharing a similar border, colonial links or language CEPII  1992-2006 
RTA_d, RTA_d_d Dummy equal to unity for country pairs sharing a services 
RTA; or equal to unity when only one country is a member of 
a services RTA  
Miroudot et al. (2010)  1992-2006 
EU_d, EU_d_d Dummy equal to unity for country pairs being member of the 
EU; or equal to unity when only one country is a member of 
the EU. 
European Union (www.europa.eu) 1992-2006 
 
28 
 
Table 4: Baseline Estimation Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Transport Transport Commun. Commun. Business Insurance Finance Trade Construc. Construc. Construc Recreat. 
ln(distance) -1.052*** -1.040*** -1.203*** -1.197*** -0.976*** -0.997*** -0.725*** -1.246*** -1.324*** -0.958*** -0.958*** -0.696*** 
 (0.0391) (0.0428) (0.0545) (0.0540) (0.128) (0.155) (0.177) (0.206) (0.158) (0.119) (0.119) (0.0520) 
Contiguity 0.210*** 0.175** 0.214** 0.216** 0.635** -0.0602 -0.255 -0.716 0.865*** 0.968*** 0.968*** 0.471*** 
 (0.0747) (0.0767) (0.0986) (0.102) (0.293) (0.448) (0.388) (0.589) (0.322) (0.310) (0.310) (0.0966) 
Colony 0.704*** 0.730*** 0.441*** 0.486*** 0.185 -0.189 -0.0890 0.222 -0.00719 0.0417 0.0417 0.307*** 
 (0.0558) (0.0585) (0.0816) (0.0809) (0.189) (0.400) (0.410) (0.522) (0.367) (0.331) (0.331) (0.0723) 
Language 0.128** 0.0957 0.346*** 0.368*** 0.558*** 1.480*** 1.202*** 0.535 -0.382 -0.769*** -0.769*** 0.343*** 
 (0.0590) (0.0602) (0.0869) (0.0861) (0.181) (0.514) (0.342) (0.369) (0.282) (0.252) (0.252) (0.0816) 
ln(GDP importer) 0.864*** 0.920*** 0.738*** 0.809*** 1.010*** 0.888*** 0.690** 1.101*** 1.109*** 0.715*** 0.715*** 0.700*** 
 (0.0251) (0.0319) (0.0440) (0.0451) (0.0645) (0.140) (0.290) (0.226) (0.107) (0.0739) (0.0739) (0.0542) 
RTA trade creation -0.240* 0.00234 0.825*** 0.776*** 0.746 0.310 1.729** 1.790* 0.697 -1.130** -1.130** 0.350 
 (0.142) (0.165) (0.209) (0.211) (0.517) (0.615) (0.871) (1.037) (0.605) (0.523) (0.523) (0.278) 
RTA trade diversion 0.0721 0.243* 0.542*** 0.535*** 0.571* 0.502 1.288*** 1.385** 0.325 -0.866** -0.866** 0.115 
 (0.133) (0.144) (0.166) (0.165) (0.312) (0.476) (0.412) (0.681) (0.366) (0.397) (0.397) (0.201) 
EU trade creation -0.645*** -0.419** -0.460* -0.647** 0.421 1.569** 1.763 - 0.298 -0.679 -0.679 -0.661** 
 (0.164) (0.200) (0.240) (0.260) (0.530) (0.671) (1.454) - (0.364) (0.514) (0.514) (0.333) 
EU trade diversion -0.647*** -0.542*** -0.266** -0.389*** 0.586*** 1.153*** 1.355* 1.452* 0.725** -0.0611 -0.0611 -0.405** 
 (0.117) (0.136) (0.128) (0.137) (0.226) (0.447) (0.707) (0.742) (0.349) (0.380) (0.380) (0.168) 
Airlines regulation importer -0.319***           -0.207*** 
 (0.0263)           (0.0360) 
Road regulation importer  -0.112***           
  (0.0261)           
Telecom regulation importer   -0.253***          
   (0.0446)          
Post regulation importer    -0.331***         
    (0.0715)         
Prof. serv. regulation importer     -0.378*** -0.547*** -0.315  -0.114    
     (0.112) (0.205) (0.276)  (0.0832)    
Retail regulation importer        -0.352     
        (0.300)     
Architect. regulation importer          -0.345   
          (0.210)   
Engineering regulation imp.           -0.443  
           (0.325)  
Fixed Effects Exp-yrs Exp-yrs Exp-yrs Exp-yrs Exp-yrs Exp-yrs Exp-yrs Exp-yrs Exp-yrs Exp-yrs Exp-yrs Exp-yrs 
Random Effects Imp-yrs Imp-yrs Imp-yrs Imp-yrs Imp-yrs Imp-yrs Imp-yrs Imp-yrs Imp-yrs Imp-yrs Imp-yrs Imp-yrs 
Observations 9220 8836 4313 4236 995 591 635 273 487 438 438 3613 
R-squared 0.760 0.734 0.713 0.719 0.792 0.651 0.642 0.708 0.674 0.554 0.554 0.686 
Notes: The dependent variable in all cases is exports (     
 ), and estimation is by GLS. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering by country-pair appear in parentheses beneath the parameter estimates.  
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Table 5: Estimation Results—Transport and Communication Services 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Transport Transport Transport Commun. Commun. Commun. Commun. 
ln(distance) -1.026*** -1.053*** -1.051*** -1.199*** -1.179*** -1.165*** -1.204*** 
 (0.0400) (0.0401) (0.0396) (0.0540) (0.0546) (0.0536) (0.0545) 
Contiguity 0.231*** 0.213*** 0.211*** 0.213** 0.223** 0.285*** 0.212** 
 (0.0754) (0.0751) (0.0746) (0.0984) (0.0985) (0.0973) (0.0987) 
Colony 0.719*** 0.696*** 0.705*** 0.448*** 0.462*** 0.423*** 0.442*** 
 (0.0561) (0.0549) (0.0561) (0.0815) (0.0807) (0.0806) (0.0819) 
Language 0.149*** 0.109* 0.130** 0.354*** 0.364*** 0.360*** 0.347*** 
 (0.0577) (0.0613) (0.0591) (0.0867) (0.0863) (0.0829) (0.0878) 
ln(GDP importer) 0.995*** 0.802*** 0.876*** 0.765*** 0.811*** 0.734*** 0.737*** 
 (0.0288) (0.0271) (0.0268) (0.0429) (0.0459) (0.0472) (0.0469) 
RTA trade creation -0.109 -0.110 -0.246* 0.804*** 0.838*** 0.878*** 0.801*** 
 (0.139) (0.155) (0.142) (0.201) (0.213) (0.197) (0.202) 
RTA trade diversion 0.147 0.140 0.0694 0.546*** 0.535*** 0.522*** 0.537*** 
 (0.127) (0.143) (0.132) (0.162) (0.167) (0.149) (0.163) 
EU trade creation -1.241*** -0.102 -0.716*** -0.530** -0.406 -0.311 -0.513** 
 (0.193) (0.180) (0.197) (0.245) (0.249) (0.246) (0.244) 
EU trade diversion -0.950*** -0.362*** -0.685*** -0.313** -0.252* -0.213* -0.299** 
 (0.130) (0.127) (0.133) (0.127) (0.132) (0.125) (0.126) 
Airline entry barriers importer -0.259***  -0.177***     
 (0.0252)  (0.0252)     
Airline publ. ownership importer  -0.207*** -0.147***     
  (0.0195) (0.0184)     
Telecom entry barriers importer    -0.194***   -0.166*** 
    (0.0304)   (0.0387) 
Telecom publ. own. importer     -0.0490*  -0.0154 
     (0.0278)  (0.0258) 
Telecom market struct. importer      -0.268*** -0.0760 
      (0.0530) (0.0637) 
Fixed Effects Exp-yrs Exp-yrs Exp-yrs Exp-yrs Exp-yrs Exp-yrs Exp-yrs 
Random Effects Imp-yrs Imp-yrs Imp-yrs Imp-yrs Imp-yrs Imp-yrs Imp-yrs 
Observations 9262 9222 9220 4313 4313 4423 4313 
R-squared 0.753 0.749 0.761 0.722 0.706 0.717 0.721 
Notes: The dependent variable in all cases is exports (     
 ), and estimation is by GLS. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering by country-pair appear in parentheses beneath the parameter estimates.  
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Table 6: Estimation Results—Business Services 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Business Business Business Business Business Business Business Business 
ln(distance) -0.940*** -0.914*** -0.953*** -0.940*** -0.947*** -0.929*** -1.054*** -1.054*** 
 (0.119) (0.139) (0.149) (0.120) (0.150) (0.138) (0.152) (0.160) 
Contiguity 0.575* 0.547* 0.412 0.485 0.491 0.497 0.634** 0.653** 
 (0.298) (0.307) (0.319) (0.308) (0.311) (0.317) (0.302) (0.309) 
Colony 0.309* 0.297 0.281 0.329** 0.285 0.225 0.122 0.148 
 (0.164) (0.195) (0.216) (0.163) (0.215) (0.214) (0.225) (0.217) 
Language 0.544*** 0.641*** 0.803*** 0.567*** 0.771*** 0.767*** 0.600*** 0.625*** 
 (0.176) (0.205) (0.229) (0.178) (0.233) (0.223) (0.200) (0.215) 
ln(GDP importer) 1.014*** 0.996*** 1.021*** 1.010*** 0.999*** 1.011*** 1.042*** 1.044*** 
 (0.0587) (0.0654) (0.0620) (0.0607) (0.0666) (0.0685) (0.0676) (0.0729) 
RTA trade creation 0.867** 0.992* 1.161** 0.812** 1.170** 0.986* 0.887 0.971* 
 (0.440) (0.544) (0.554) (0.410) (0.544) (0.592) (0.577) (0.541) 
RTA trade diversion 0.518* 0.642** 0.768** 0.485* 0.814** 0.690** 0.753** 0.789** 
 (0.296) (0.293) (0.321) (0.264) (0.324) (0.340) (0.340) (0.312) 
EU trade creation -0.0514 0.451 0.514 -0.0226 0.589 0.587 0.555 0.466 
 (0.474) (0.587) (0.606) (0.463) (0.627) (0.611) (0.598) (0.602) 
EU trade diversion 0.396 0.380 0.398 0.377 0.468 0.526* 0.617** 0.556** 
 (0.249) (0.254) (0.296) (0.246) (0.345) (0.308) (0.245) (0.278) 
Licensing requirement importer -0.243***   -0.238***     
 (0.0639)   (0.0734)     
Education requirement importer  -0.242**  -0.0415     
  (0.103)  (0.111)     
Quota & econ. need test importer   0.0787 0.127*     
   (0.0547) (0.0752)     
Business form reg. importer     -0.0183   0.113 
     (0.0972)   (0.114) 
Reg. on advertising importer      -0.163*  -0.0420 
      (0.0926)  (0.128) 
Reg. on prices & fees importer       -0.175** -0.187* 
       (0.0722) (0.104) 
Fixed Effects Exp-yrs Exp-yrs Exp-yrs Exp-yrs Exp-yrs Exp-yrs Exp-yrs Exp-yrs 
Random Effects Imp-yrs Imp-yrs Imp-yrs Imp-yrs Imp-yrs Imp-yrs Imp-yrs Imp-yrs 
Observations 1007 1007 1007 1007 976 988 988 976 
R-squared 0.805 0.789 0.783 0.808 0.781 0.788 0.797 0.794 
Notes: The dependent variable in all cases is exports (     
 ), and estimation is by GLS. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering by country-pair appear in parentheses beneath the parameter estimates. 
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Table 7: Estimation Results—Insurance Services 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Insurance Insurance Insurance Insurance Insurance Insurance Insurance Insurance 
ln(distance) -0.988*** -0.858*** -0.929*** -0.916*** -0.934*** -0.902*** -1.034*** -0.980*** 
 (0.135) (0.167) (0.193) (0.146) (0.182) (0.174) (0.186) (0.171) 
Contiguity -0.240 -0.144 -0.403 -0.257 -0.376 -0.330 -0.247 -0.226 
 (0.433) (0.474) (0.438) (0.459) (0.433) (0.445) (0.444) (0.452) 
Colony 0.0665 -0.139 -0.150 0.0666 -0.0599 -0.221 -0.147 -0.213 
 (0.381) (0.386) (0.439) (0.363) (0.390) (0.345) (0.402) (0.359) 
Language 1.307*** 1.685*** 1.821*** 1.348*** 1.825*** 1.990*** 1.699*** 1.828*** 
 (0.506) (0.501) (0.574) (0.492) (0.542) (0.552) (0.535) (0.511) 
ln(GDP importer) 0.866*** 0.886*** 0.856*** 0.868*** 0.837*** 0.873*** 0.861*** 0.885*** 
 (0.135) (0.135) (0.142) (0.121) (0.151) (0.151) (0.145) (0.168) 
RTA trade creation 0.828 0.895 0.824 0.948 0.543 0.392 0.429 0.225 
 (0.568) (0.617) (0.572) (0.581) (0.657) (0.490) (0.602) (0.555) 
RTA trade diversion 0.645 0.791** 0.727* 0.731* 0.546 0.574* 0.655 0.554 
 (0.442) (0.380) (0.413) (0.385) (0.506) (0.345) (0.455) (0.468) 
EU trade creation 0.769 1.560** 1.902*** 0.822 2.035*** 1.944*** 1.935*** 1.989*** 
 (0.793) (0.712) (0.679) (0.678) (0.702) (0.615) (0.683) (0.676) 
EU trade diversion 0.811* 0.877** 1.088** 0.728* 1.243** 1.144*** 1.222** 1.246** 
 (0.473) (0.405) (0.461) (0.396) (0.507) (0.418) (0.491) (0.509) 
Licensing requirement importer -0.334***   -0.241**     
 (0.116)   (0.0998)     
Education requirement importer  -0.438**  -0.354**     
  (0.200)  (0.164)     
Quota & econ. need test importer   0.0712 0.166*     
   (0.0507) (0.100)     
Business form reg. importer     -0.163   -0.000238 
     (0.155)   (0.190) 
Reg. on advertising importer      -0.310**  -0.224 
      (0.152)  (0.212) 
Reg. on prices & fees importer       -0.166* -0.120 
             (0.0926) (0.132) 
Fixed Effects Exp-yrs Exp-yrs Exp-yrs Exp-yrs Exp-yrs Exp-yrs Exp-yrs Exp-yrs 
Random Effects Imp-yrs Imp-yrs Imp-yrs Imp-yrs Imp-yrs Imp-yrs Imp-yrs Imp-yrs 
Observations 600 600 600 600 586 595 595 586 
R-squared 0.666 0.646 0.622 0.678 0.626 0.640 0.640 0.641 
Notes: The dependent variable in all cases is exports (     
 ), and estimation is by GLS. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering by country-pair appear in parentheses beneath the parameter estimates. 
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Table 8: Estimation Results—Financial Services 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Finance Finance Finance Finance Finance Finance Finance Finance 
ln(distance) -0.716*** -0.606*** -0.736*** -0.575*** -0.728*** -0.773*** -0.800*** -0.877*** 
 (0.152) (0.176) (0.201) (0.190) (0.201) (0.192) (0.218) (0.223) 
Contiguity -0.327 -0.166 -0.643 -0.408 -0.571 -0.592 -0.431 -0.415 
 (0.362) (0.406) (0.443) (0.400) (0.461) (0.449) (0.384) (0.410) 
Colony 0.152 0.146 0.0257 0.271 0.0993 0.204 0.0570 0.0600 
 (0.358) (0.394) (0.431) (0.364) (0.448) (0.456) (0.452) (0.471) 
Language 1.035*** 1.056** 1.475*** 0.974*** 1.558*** 1.502*** 1.338*** 1.403*** 
 (0.341) (0.429) (0.489) (0.316) (0.459) (0.469) (0.388) (0.362) 
ln(GDP importer) 0.706** 0.680** 0.733** 0.643** 0.703*** 0.734*** 0.721** 0.733*** 
 (0.288) (0.282) (0.287) (0.284) (0.273) (0.270) (0.296) (0.273) 
RTA trade creation 2.030*** 1.839** 2.027** 1.863*** 2.184** 2.287** 1.870* 2.252** 
 (0.762) (0.770) (0.846) (0.685) (0.873) (0.902) (0.973) (0.954) 
RTA trade diversion 1.440*** 1.323*** 1.397*** 1.354*** 1.523*** 1.570*** 1.432*** 1.653*** 
 (0.336) (0.353) (0.406) (0.265) (0.469) (0.441) (0.440) (0.476) 
EU trade creation 0.985 1.652 1.861 1.285 1.820 1.809 1.866 1.763 
 (1.585) (1.353) (1.357) (1.628) (1.374) (1.315) (1.370) (1.369) 
EU trade diversion 0.926 1.013 1.250* 0.758 1.218* 1.220* 1.389** 1.307* 
 (0.827) (0.616) (0.706) (0.717) (0.708) (0.652) (0.648) (0.698) 
Licensing requirement importer -0.267*   -0.0969     
 (0.161)   (0.233)     
Education requirement importer  -0.480**  -0.567*     
  (0.212)  (0.343)     
Quota & econ. need test importer   0.157** 0.318***     
   (0.0718) (0.120)     
Business form reg. importer     0.0771   0.0771 
     (0.284)   (0.290) 
Reg. on advertising importer      0.146  0.272 
      (0.251)  (0.241) 
Reg. on prices & fees importer       -0.113 -0.174 
       (0.153) (0.196) 
Fixed Effects Exp-yrs Exp-yrs Exp-yrs Exp-yrs Exp-yrs Exp-yrs Exp-yrs Exp-yrs 
Random Effects Imp-yrs Imp-yrs Imp-yrs Imp-yrs Imp-yrs Imp-yrs Imp-yrs Imp-yrs 
Observations 647 647 647 647 629 641 641 629 
R-squared 0.658 0.661 0.644 0.681 0.641 0.648 0.650 0.652 
Notes: The dependent variable in all cases is exports (     
 ), and estimation is by GLS. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering by country-pair appear in parentheses beneath the parameter estimates. 
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Table 9: Estimation Results – Construction Services 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Construc. Construc. Construc. Construc. Construc. Construc. Construc. Construc. 
ln(distance) -1.366*** -1.299*** -1.327*** -1.220*** -1.300*** -1.330*** -1.386*** -1.393*** 
 (0.134) (0.140) (0.143) (0.145) (0.143) (0.144) (0.144) (0.140) 
Contiguity 0.850** 0.967*** 0.863** 0.882** 0.943*** 0.900** 0.917** 0.971*** 
 (0.356) (0.364) (0.378) (0.386) (0.360) (0.362) (0.360) (0.355) 
Colony 0.177 0.293 0.136 0.380 0.174 0.127 0.0651 0.0315 
 (0.386) (0.385) (0.396) (0.384) (0.397) (0.396) (0.411) (0.401) 
Language -0.490 -0.615* -0.341 -0.604* -0.389 -0.354 -0.419 -0.529* 
 (0.317) (0.332) (0.309) (0.333) (0.307) (0.303) (0.312) (0.301) 
ln(GDP importer) 1.103*** 1.126*** 1.099*** 1.144*** 1.093*** 1.102*** 1.123*** 1.143*** 
 (0.110) (0.103) (0.111) (0.100) (0.114) (0.109) (0.106) (0.115) 
RTA trade creation 0.881 0.645 0.751 0.316 0.775 0.762 0.724 0.571 
 (0.602) (0.602) (0.609) (0.515) (0.603) (0.620) (0.637) (0.670) 
RTA trade diversion 0.416 0.404 0.308 0.213 0.306 0.335 0.370 0.275 
 (0.352) (0.394) (0.380) (0.351) (0.373) (0.374) (0.357) (0.386) 
EU trade creation -0.163 -0.289 0.401 -0.261 0.315 0.408 0.398 0.155 
 (0.520) (0.416) (0.354) (0.445) (0.389) (0.345) (0.361) (0.411) 
EU trade diversion 0.530 0.362 0.718** 0.276 0.621* 0.725** 0.751** 0.561 
 (0.369) (0.341) (0.343) (0.325) (0.375) (0.329) (0.339) (0.398) 
Licensing requirement importer -0.0817   0.0787     
 (0.0594)   (0.0847)     
Education requirement importer  -0.218**  -0.383***     
  (0.0865)  (0.128)     
Quota & econ. need test importer   0.0362 0.161**     
   (0.0548) (0.0702)     
Business form reg. importer     0.0951   0.239* 
     (0.117)   (0.132) 
Reg. on advertising importer      -0.0134  -0.0676 
      (0.0765)  (0.102) 
Reg. on price & fee importer       -0.0452 -0.0950 
       (0.0622) (0.0632) 
FE Exp-yrs Exp-yrs Exp-yrs Exp-yrs Exp-yrs Exp-yrs Exp-yrs Exp-yrs 
RE Imp-yrs Imp-yrs Imp-yrs Imp-yrs Imp-yrs Imp-yrs Imp-yrs Imp-yrs 
Observations 468 468 468 468 460 468 468 460 
R-squared 0.676 0.686 0.673 0.695 0.672 0.672 0.674 0.678 
Notes: The dependent variable in all cases is exports (     
 ), and estimation is by GLS. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering by country-pair appear in parentheses beneath the parameter estimates. 
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Table 10: Estimation Results—Recreation and Distribution Services 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Recreation Recreation Recreation Trade Trade Trade Trade Trade 
ln(distance) -0.683*** -0.701*** -0.701*** -1.246*** -1.268*** -1.311*** -1.261*** -1.234*** 
 (0.0512) (0.0530) (0.0529) (0.206) (0.230) (0.269) (0.243) (0.228) 
Contiguity 0.466*** 0.477*** 0.477*** -0.716 -0.732 -0.738 -0.871 -0.834 
 (0.0965) (0.0965) (0.0965) (0.589) (0.602) (0.658) (0.595) (0.628) 
Colony 0.322*** 0.305*** 0.306*** 0.222 0.193 0.178 -0.0952 -0.0192 
 (0.0723) (0.0723) (0.0722) (0.522) (0.514) (0.497) (0.619) (0.546) 
Language 0.361*** 0.330*** 0.329*** 0.535 0.504 0.589 0.785* 0.709* 
 (0.0818) (0.0816) (0.0817) (0.369) (0.371) (0.413) (0.407) (0.400) 
ln(GDP importer) 0.788*** 0.644*** 0.659*** 1.101*** 1.127*** 1.111*** 1.102*** 1.102*** 
 (0.0515) (0.0592) (0.0592) (0.226) (0.238) (0.258) (0.213) (0.220) 
RTA trade creation 0.433 0.385 0.364 1.790* 1.817 1.667* 1.063 1.259 
 (0.284) (0.275) (0.278) (1.037) (1.170) (1.002) (0.957) (1.059) 
RTA trade diversion 0.160 0.120 0.114 1.385** 1.406** 1.358* 1.052 1.132* 
 (0.202) (0.200) (0.201) (0.681) (0.714) (0.697) (0.644) (0.638) 
EU trade creation -0.946*** -0.198 -0.379 - - - - - 
 (0.355) (0.334) (0.372) - - - - - 
EU trade diversion -0.551*** -0.160 -0.255 1.452* 1.071 1.306 0.968 1.067 
 (0.185) (0.169) (0.193) (0.742) (0.865) (1.016) (0.821) (0.958) 
Airline entry barriers importer -0.134***  -0.0446      
 (0.0387)  (0.0443)      
Airline publ. ownership importer  -0.162*** -0.147***      
  (0.0257) (0.0299)      
Retail overall regulation importer    -0.352     
    (0.300)     
Retail entry barriers importer     -0.195   -0.0959 
     (0.268)   (0.313) 
Retail operat. restr. importer      -0.171  0.0145 
      (0.220)  (0.281) 
Retail price controls importer       -0.383* -0.347 
       (0.209) (0.214) 
Fixed Effects Exp-yrs Exp-yrs Exp-yrs Exp-yrs Exp-yrs Exp-yrs Exp-yrs Exp-yrs 
Random Effects Imp-yrs Imp-yrs Imp-yrs Imp-yrs Imp-yrs Imp-yrs Imp-yrs Imp-yrs 
Observations 3624 3613 3613 273 273 273 273 273 
R-squared 0.679 0.686 0.687 0.708 0.702 0.697 0.717 0.718 
Notes: The dependent variable in all cases is exports (     
 ), and estimation is by GLS. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering by country-pair appear in parentheses beneath the parameter estimates. 
